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The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as well
as support from the government and from private foundations, have made
it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated center of
applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their relations
involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely positioned to
make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related resources, which
include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as well as a Tokyo-
based office. Through its three core activities, namely, education,
research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates both to its
sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese science
and technology and on how that science and technology is managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
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Abstract
DOES OWNERSHIP MATTER?
ASIA AND THE GLOBAL OPERATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
[Dennis J. Encarnation]
Today, Asia (outside of Japan) is the principal host to foreign direct investment
(FDI) destined for newly-industrializing economies. And when compared to more
industrialized countries, Asia now ranks behind North America and Western Europe,
which continue to account for the lions' share of both existing stocks and new flows of
FDI. But Asia's leading status, even among newly-industrializing economies, is quite
new: Just a decade ago, in 1985, FDI flows to Latin America still outpaced comparable
flows to Asia, leaving accumulated stocks in that region well below FDI found elsewhere.
But subsequently, FDI flows to Asia accelerated rapidly, especially during the 1990s,
when they jumped well beyond levels recorded in any other developing region.
Within Asia, most of this FDI is concentrated in a very few economies, and comes
from a very few sources. Today, just three hosts--Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore--
account for over one-half of all accumulated stocks originating in either the United
States or Japan, still the two largest national sources of FDI into Asia. Shifting from
stocks to flows, just one host--China--accounts today for over one-half of all new FDI
in Asia. But China's leading status is quite new: As recently as 1990, Singapore
received more FDI inflows than did China. Subsequently, however, FDI to China
skyrocketed, accounting for nearly half of all Asian inflows. Leading this recent surge
are Asian investors, from Korea and especially the Chinese communities located in Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and across ASEAN. During the 1990s, these regional investors easily
surpassed both the Americans and the Japanese as Asia's leading sources of FDI.
Much of that FDI is now integral to the Asian operations of multinational
corporations (MNCs) based in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere in Asia. Over
time, these operations have begun to converge despite obvious differences among MNCs in
their geographic and historical origins. Such convergence has at times been even more
pronounced in Asia than elsewhere in the world, as demonstrated by the common
geographic and industrial concentration of FDI from various sources. More often, MNCs
in Asia more closely mimic patterns of convergence apparent elsewhere, as they do in
the pursuit of majority shareholdings and FDI-generated sales. Yet important
differences in MNC operations persist, even in the same location and industry. In home-
country sourcing and intra-firm trade, for example, MNCs in Asia differ much like they
do elsewhere in the world. Such differences may even be more pronounced in Asia than
elsewhere, as demonstrated by wide variation in host-market and export sales. Taken
together, then, the regional operations of multinational corporations in Asia confirm the
persistence of important operational differences, while also reaffirming that these same
multinationals are moving along an otherwise common evolutionary path.
When combined, these emerging similarities and persistent differences have
important implications for both corporate strategy and government policy. For
example, sharp differences can still be discerned between multinationals in their
determination of markets for outputs, sources for inputs, and the organization of that
trade between markets (arm's-length transactions) and hierarchies (intra-firm
transactions). Just as the relationship between FDI and trade varies significantly among
multinational corporations, so too that relationship also varies among national
economies. Bounded in absolute value by more macro-economic determinants, FDI can
contribute proportionately to that trade, while also altering its composition and
direction--not only for individual multinationals, but also for host (and home)
economies. Simultaneously, such trade can have a significant impact on the value,
direction, and composition of FDI, again at both the micro-level of multinationals and the
macro-level of national economies. These complementarities between FDI and trade have
important policy consequences: Cross-national differences in trade and FDI regimes can
explain much of the wide variation in the relative contribution of multinationals to
host-country exports and imports across Asia.
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DOES OWNERSHIP MATTER?
ASIA AND THE GLOBAL OPERATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Dennis J. Encarnation
Today, Asia (outside of Japan) is the principal host to foreign direct investment
(FDI) destined for newly-industrializing economies.1 And when compared to more
industrialized countries, Asia now ranks behind North America and Western Europe,
which continue to account for the lions' share of both existing stocks and new flows of
FDI. But Asia's leading status, even among newly-industrializing economies, is quite
new: Just a decade ago, in 1985, FDI flows to Latin America still outpaced comparable
flows to Asia, leaving accumulated stocks in that region well below FDI found elsewhere.
But subsequently, FDI flows to Asia accelerated rapidly, especially during the 1990s,
when they jumped well beyond levels recorded in any other developing region.
Within Asia, as we shall see below, most of this FDI is concentrated in a very few
economies, and comes from a very few sources. Today, just three hosts--Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Singapore--account for over one-half of all accumulated stocks originating in
either the United States or Japan, still the two largest national sources of FDI in Asia.
Shifting from stocks to flows, just one host--China-accounts today for over one-half
of all new FDI in Asia. But China's leading status is quite new: As recently as 1990,
Singapore received more FDI inflows than did China. Subsequently, however, FDI to
China skyrocketed, accounting for nearly half of all Asian inflows. Leading this recent
surge are Asian investors, from Korea and especially the Chinese communities located in
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and across ASEAN. During the 1990s, these regional investors
surpassed both the Americans and the Japanese as Asia's leading sources of FDI flows.
Much of that FDI is now integral to the Asian operations of multinational
corporations (MNCs) based in the United States, Japan, Korea, and elsewhere in Asia.
Over time, as documented in great detail below, these operations have begun to converge
despite obvious differences among MNCs in their geographic and historical origins. Such
convergence has at times been even more pronounced in Asia than elsewhere in the
1
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world, as demonstrated by the common geographic and industrial concentration of FDI
from various sources. More often, MNCs in Asia more closely mimic patterns of
convergence apparent elsewhere, as they do in the pursuit of majority shareholdings and
FDI-generated sales. Yet important differences in MNC operations persist, even in the
same location and industry. In home-country sourcing and intra-firm trade, for
example, MNCs in Asia differ much like they do elsewhere in the world. Such differences
may even be more pronounced in Asia than elsewhere, as demonstrated by wide variation
in host-market and export sales. Taken together, then, the regional operations of
multinational corporations in Asia confirm the persistence of important operational
differences, while also reaffirming that these same multinationals are moving along an
otherwise common evolutionary path.
When combined, these emerging similarities and persistent differences have
important implications for both corporate strategy and government policy, implications
explored in the concluding section of this paper. As we shall see, sharp differences can
still be discerned between multinationals in their determination of markets for outputs,
sources for inputs, and the organization of that trade between markets (arm's-length
transactions) and hierarchies (intra-firm transactions). Just as the relationship
between FDI and trade varies significantly among multinational corporations, so too that
relationship also varies among national economies. Bounded in absolute value by more
macro-economic determinants, FDI can contribute proportionately to that trade, while
also altering its composition and direction--not only for individual multinationals, but
also for host (and home) economies. Simultaneously, such trade can have a significant
impact on the value, direction, and composition of FDI, again at both the micro-level of
multinationals and the macro-level of national economies. These complementarities
between FDI and trade have important policy consequences: Cross-national differences
in trade and FDI regimes can explain much of the wide variation in the relative
contribution of multinationals to host-country exports and imports across Asia.
2
Beginning with a broad survey of FDI sources and destinations, this paper moves
to examine in greater detail the regional operations of multinationals making that
investment, before concluding with an assessment of the broad implication of these
several findings for both corporate strategy and government policy.
FDI SOURCES AND DESTINATIONS
The two largest national sources of FDI in Asia are Japan and the United States.
By 1993 (the most recent year for which comparable data are available, and reported in
Table 1) American and Japanese multinationals each contributed roughly one-sixth
(between 15 and 17 percent) of all FDI flows into newly-industrializing Asia--a share
that rises to one-quarter of all FDI flowing into Asia outside of China. By contrast,
according to the best available estimates, European multinationals probably contributed
no more than 10 percent of Asia's FDI inflows2--less than one-half the relative
contribution of either American or Japanese multinationals. The remainder,
contributing well over two-thirds of all FDI flows into Asia (and over four-fifths of all
FDI flows into China), came from other, principally Asian investors largely based in the
newly-industrializing economies of Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan.
-- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE --
US and Japanese FDI
Historically, American multinationals have long concentrated most of their
foreign direct investment outside of Asia, in North and South America, as well as in
Western Europe--in marked contrast to the Japanese, who have long placed a far greater
emphasis on their Asian neighbors. Prior to the Second World War, Asia attracted the
lion's share (over three-quarters, by one estimate3 ) of all Japanese direct investments
3
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TABLE 1
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) FLOWS
INTO ASIA, BY DESTINATION AND SOURCE, 1993
ASIA INCLUDING CHINA ($ billion)
"Greater China," of which:
China $27.5
less "round-tripping"a -$10.0
estimated FDI in China =$17.5
Hong Kongb $1.7
Taiwan $0.9
Other East Asiac $17.2
of which: Singapore $6.8
South Asia $1.1
Total FDI Flows into Asiad $38.4
of which:
US FDI $5.8
Japanese FDI $6.6
Korean, Chinese, Other $26.0
ASIA EXCLUDING CHINA ($ billion)
"Three Dragons," of which:
Singapore $ 6.8
Hong Kongb $1.7
Taiwan $0.9
Other East Asiac $10.4
South Asia $1.1
Total FDI Flows into Asiad $20.9
of which:
US FDI $5.2
Japanese FDI $4.9
Korean, Chinese, Other $10.8
Notes: aDomestic Chinese investment temporarily
recycled principally through Hong Kong in
order to receive foreign-investment incentives
upon reentry into China.
blncludes only FDI from OECD member countries.
CExcludes Japan.
dExcludes Western Asia and former Soviet Central
Asian Republics.
Sources: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics and World Bank
estimates, May 1995, UNCTAD estimates, July 1995.
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abroad; while for the Americans, the comparable Asian share was minuscule (probably
under 5 percent4 ), less than any other region of the world except Africa. After the war,
that Asian share actually declined for the Americans, leveling out to roughly 3 percent,
where it stayed well into the 1970s. Meanwhile, most Japanese investments in Asia
were nationalized by their host countries after the war, and new FDI outflows were
reduced to a trickle, as capital controls at home and lingering animosities abroad nearly
eradicated the prewar investments of Japanese corporations in Asia.
But during the 1970s and (especially) the 1980s, both Japanese and American
multinationals would greatly accelerate their new investments in Asia. At least for the
Americans, that growth greatly outpaced increases elsewhere, leading Asia to nearly
double its share of U.S. FDI, from less than 4 percent as recently as 1977,5 to nearly 8
percent by 1994 (calculated from Table 2). That growth actually catapulted Asia past
South America as the leading site for U.S. FDI among emerging markets. For the
Japanese, however, Asia consistently ranked much higher, among the top two or three
destinations for their FDI: By 1994, Asia had come to account for 16 percent of all
approved Japanese FDI worldwide--comparable to Western Europe (see Table 2), but
well behind North America and comparable figures before the war.
-- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE --
While American and Japanese multinationals continue to differ in terms of the
relative importance they assign Asia as a desirable destination for their FDI, they both
have long concentrated their different Asian investments in a very few host countries.
Before the war, for example, China, the Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies
(later, Indonesia) each hosted more U.S. FDI than did Japan. 6 Among these, the United
States long harbored colonial ambitions in China's large domestic market, while the
Philippines had become a U.S. territory, one blessed with plentiful natural resources,
4
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TABLE 2
ACCUMULATED STOCKS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) BY AMERICAN
AND JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS (MNCs), 1994
AMERICAN MNCs ABROAD. 1994a
Location of FDI 1994 ($ bil.)
Worldwide $612.1
North America $89.2
Western Europe $300.2
Japan $37.0
Other East Asia $47.3
JAPANESE MNCs
Location of FDI
Worldwide
North America
Western Europe
ABROAD. 1994b
1994 ($ bil.)
$463.6
$202.7
$89.9
East Asia $76.2
of which:
Four NIEs
Korea
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Singapore
ASEAN Four
Thailand
Malaysia
Indonesia
Philippines
Big Two
India
China
of which:
Manufacturing
Chemicals
Electronics
All Other
Petroleum
Wholesaling
Finance
% of East Asia
7.6%
8.2%
25.3%
23.2%
8.0%
5.0%
10.6%
5.0%
1.7%
3.6%
% of East Asia
34.8%
5.9%
11.8%
65.2%
20.7%
16.3%
20.9%
of which:
Four NIEs
Korea
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Singapore
ASEAN Four
Thailand
Malaysia
Indonesia
Philippines
Big Two
India
China
of which:
Manufacturing
Textiles
Electronics
All Other
Mining
Wholesaling
Finance
% of East Asia
7.0%
5.2%
18.2%
12.5%
9.4%
8.4%
22.3%
3.7%
0.6%
11.4%
% of East Asiac
43.2%
3.8%
10.1%
66.8%
12.2%
9.1%
10.2%
Notes: aHistorical-costs basis.
bApproval basis.
c1993 data.
Sources: United States, Department of Commerce, 1994, pp. 88-124; 1986, Table 1, pp. 1-
5; 1982, Table 1, pp. 1-27; Japan, Ministry of Finance, 1994, n.p.
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many of which also became available in greater abundance in the Netherlands East Indies.
Colonization had an even stronger impact on the Japanese: On the eve of the war, China
(especially Manchuria) hosted the lion's share of all Japanese FDI worldwide, followed
by Korea and Taiwan. After the war, however, the Japanese were excluded from most of
their former colonial possessions, while the Americans remained concentrated in the
Philippines which, along with India, accounted for over one-half of all U.S. FDI in Asia
as late as 1966.7 Through the 1960s, host governments in the Philippines, India, and
elsewhere across the region had erected steep trade barriers which (as we shall see
below) induced a few prospective U.S. exporters to invest in foreign manufacturing in
order to supply protected local markets.
Subsequently, however, the principal incentives for foreign direct investment in
Asia shifted dramatically, as did the geographic concentration of that investment. As a
result, by the 1994, three economies--Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Singapore--accounted
for well over one-half of all the FDI located in Asia by either American or Japanese
multinationals. For sure, they differed in their rank-ordering of these three hosts.
Hong Kong and Singapore accounted for roughly one-half of all U.S. FDI in Asia outside of
Japan, with Indonesia leading a third tier of host countries. For the Japanese, Indonesia
retained its historical lead, but its relative share had nearly been cut in half during the
1980s,8 leaving it by 1994 with less than one-quarter of all Japanese FDI in Asia (see
Table 2). Fast approaching, growing during the 1980s at twice the rate recorded in Asia
as a whole, were Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which had raced past Korea on the way
to ranking second and third (respectively) among Asian hosts to Japanese FDI.
By concentrating their FDI in these three countries, American and Japanese
multinationals followed comparable Strategies. For both, Hong Kong bolstered its
position as the regional center for dstribution, finance, and other trade-related service
(all increasingly directed at China); Indonesia remained the Asian center for petroleum,
mining, and other extractive industries; Singapore emerged as a regional center for
5
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manufacturing, especially of electronics. Thus, across these three countries, a similar
pattern of national specialization has attracted both American and Japanese
multinationals.
The Americans, at least, have contributed to such national specialization by
concentrating their Asian operations in a very few countries, where they have invested
in a very few economic sectors (see Table 2). Simply put, American multinationals in
Asia engage in a narrower range of extractive, manufacturing, and service industries
than they do elsewhere in the world. Petroleum, for example, contributes twice the
proportion of U.S. FDI in Asia that it does elsewhere in the world, even though its share
has recently begun to decline.9 Moreover, the ever-growing share of U.S. FDI invested
in Asian wholesaling is also much higher than in other regions. Only manufacturing
attracts shares of U.S. FDI comparable to those elsewhere; yet even here, those shares
have been growing in Asia while they have been declining worldwide. And within
manufacturing, U.S. FDI in the electronics industry stands out for its greater
concentration in Asia (12 percent of all U.S. FDI in Asia versus 3 percent of all U.S. FDI
worldwide10). By comparison, U.S. FDI in chemicals stands out for its limited presence
in Asia, especially since it is the largest source of U.S. FDI in manufacturing worldwide.
But this is a recent pattern: For as recently as 1977, what little U.S. FDI entered Asian
manufacturing was more likely to produce chemicals and not electronics.1 1 In short, the
surge of U.S. FDI into Asian electronics is quite recent, having principally occurred
during the 1980s, reflecting that region's growing specialization in electronics.
Compared to the Americans, Japanese multinationals are more widely dispersed
both sectorally and geographically. In Asian manufacturing, for example, Japanese
multinationals have become even more diversified than their American counterparts,
with far more investment spread out across numerous sectors and several countries. To
illustrate: While electronics attracts much FDI in Asia, that industry nevertheless
accounts for a smaller proportion of Japanese investment across the region than it does
6
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for the Americans (see Table 2). Alternatively, textiles attracts a much higher
proportion of Japanese FDI in the region--not just because U.S. FDI in that sector is
virtually nonexistent, but also because textiles was the leading recipient of Japanese FDI
in Asian manufacturing up until the 1980s, when American and then Japanese FDI in
Asian electronics took-off. Such growth in Japanese FDI has actually increased the
geographic spread of Japanese investments in Asian manufacturing. Indeed, the second
tier of Asian hosts (especially China and Thailand) is rapidly approaching the first tier
as principal destinations for Japanese FDI. And with that growth, the Asian investments
of Japanese multinationals are becoming ever-more diffused across countries and
industries--moving in a direction opposite that of the Americans.
While both American and Japanese multinationals have come to concentrate a
sizable--at least in recent years, growing-- share of their FDI in Asia, European
multinationals have not. Indeed, according to the best estimates available, Asia actually
accounts for a small and declining share of the worldwide FDI of multinationals based in
the European Union.12 As a result, European multinationals probably contributed no
more than 10 percent of Asia's FDI inflows--less than one-half the relative
contribution of either American or Japanese multinationals. And this European
contribution was minuscule compared to large and growing levels of intra-regional FDI
from Asia's newly industrializing economies. For in addition to Japan, the principal
sources of intra-regional FDI in Asia are either Korea or the largely ethnic Chinese
sources of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan.
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Korean and Ethnic Chinese FDI
By 1993, Korean multinationals had concentrated their modest foreign direct
investments (stocks) in the Pacific Basin, roughly balanced between North America
(mainly the United States) and Asia, with each region accounting for nearly 40 percent
of all Korean FDI. 13 Of the remaining 20 percent, one-half was located in Western
Europe. By sector, manufacturing accounted for over two-fifths of all Korean FDI
worldwide, with much of this engaged in the production of basic and fabricated metals.
Much of the remaining Korean FDI was engaged in wholesale (and retail) trade, followed
by the processing of petroleum and other natural resources. But the geographic location
of these sectoral investments varies widely across critical markets and sources of
supply. Of these, three--the United States, Indonesia, and China--accounted for well
over one-half all Korean FDI worldwide. And they illustrated the broad range of
investment strategies adopted by Korean multinationals.
The United States has long been the single largest host for Korean direct
investments, accounting in 1993 for nearly one-third of total stocks. Existing trade
patterns help explain this concentration of Korean FDI: The United States is also the
single largest market for Korean exports, accounting for over one-quarter of that trade,
and Korea's second largest supplier of imports, accounting for over one-fifth of the
total.14 To assist in this two-way flow of trade, in ways discussed below, FDI engaged
principally in retail and especially wholesale trade accounted for nearly one-half of all
Korean stocks in the United States. So large are Korean investments in this US sector
that they represented approximately two-thirds of all Korean FDI engaged in wholesale
and retail trade around the world. Beyond wholesaling, the United States was also the
single largest host to Korean FDI engaged in manufacturing, which accounts for more
than one-fifth of all Korean stocks in the United States. There, the largest share of
Korean manufacturing FDI produces basic metals which, as we shall see below, are
8
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destined for sale principally in the domestic US market--the sales destination for most
multinationals operating in the United States.
Indonesia has long been the second largest destination for Korean FDI, accounting
for less than one-half the stocks invested in the United States during 1993--but well
above any other Asian destination. In marked contrast to the United States, Indonesia
hosts negligible Korean FDI engaged in either wholesale or retail trade. Of course, for
Korea, Indonesia is neither a leading export market (ranked eight in 1992) nor a
leading import source (ranked seventh).15 What is imported from Indonesia, however,
consists principally of petroleum and other natural resources. In these sectors,
Indonesia is the largest single destination worldwide for Korean FDI, accounting for
nearly two-fifths of all Korean FDI stocks. As a result, Korean FDI in petroleum and
other natural resources, presumably for export back home, accounted for well over
one-half of all Korean FDI in Indonesia during 1993. What remained of Korean FDI in
Indonesia was engaged principally in manufacturing a wide range of products, of which
textiles and leather products contributed the largest share. Since textiles and leather
products figure prominently among Korean exports to the United States and elsewhere,16
it seems safe to assume that Korean multinationals in these sectors are also exporting
their Indonesian products to these critical markets--a common strategy, as we shall see
below, for all multinationals operating in Asia.
China only recently emerged as the third largest destination for Korean FDI,
accounting for nearly 9 percent of all stocks in 1993, up from less than one percent as
recently as 1990.17 While Korean multinationals have focused more on wholesale trade
in the United States and on natural resources in Indonesia, they have concentrated nearly
all of their FDI in China in the manufacturing sector. There, Korean manufacturers
produced a broad range of products, of which textiles and leather products again
contributed the largest share. While the domestic Chinese market undoubtedly consumes
a sizable proportion of this manufactured output, much of that output--especially
9
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textiles and leather products--is again presumably exported either back home for
additional processing or directly to the United States and other third-country markets.
Thus, China is emerging as the largest single Asian repository of Korean manufacturing
outside of Korea itself.
For newly-emergent Asian multinationals, especially those based in Hong Kong
and Taiwan, China has emerged as the largest single destination for their FDI. But the
actual size of their FDI in China is difficult to calculate. For example, the World Bank
estimated that roughly $4 out of ever $11 directly invested in China during 1992 was
actually domestic Chinese investment temporarily recycled through Hong Kong in order
to receive foreign-investment incentives upon reentry into China (so-called "round-
tripping"). Applying this estimate to 1993 means that $27.5 billion of recorded FDI
inflows should actually be reduced to $17.5 billion of actual FDI inflows (see Table 1).
Of this sum, between three-quarters1 8 and four-fifths19 originates in either
Hong Kong or Taiwan. Among these two sources, the precise division remains unclear for
at least two reasons. First, until recently, capital controls in Taiwan limited (if not
proscribed) direct flows of capital from Taiwan to China; to circumvent such controls,
Taiwanese investors reportedly channeled their FDI through Hong Kong as an
intermediary stop on their way to China. Second, the Taiwanese are not the only foreign
investors who have routed their FDI first through their subsidiaries in Hong Kong before
entering China, even in the absence of capital controls back home. Even though both
routings inflate Hong Kong's contribution to FDI in China, that contribution probably
still exceeds $13 billion. This sum certainly represented roughly one-third of all FDI
flows to Asia during 1993, and probably represented well over one-half of all FDI flows
across Asia recorded by ethnic Chines multinationals.
Of course, China is not the only host of intra-regional FDI inflows from either
Hong Kong or Taiwan, as the case of Thailand illustrates.2 0 Nor are Hong Kong and
Taiwan the only home bases for ethnic Chinese multinationals, many of which also arise
10
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from the Chinese communities located either in Singapore or scattered across the rest of
ASEAN (mainly Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand). Indeed, a Sino-Thai
conglomerate, CP, is reportedly the largest single foreign investor in China. Meanwhile
back in Thailand, largely ethnic Chinese investors based in Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Taiwan contributed nearly two-fifths of all FDI inflows between 1990 and 1993, finally
surpassing Japan (the largest source of FDI inflows during the second half of the
1980s), and double the relative contribution of US FDI inflows. In short, ethnic Chinese
multinationals have emerged as a major source of intraregional FDI flows, especially in
east and southeast Asia.
Not only is the Asian FDI of ethnic Chinese corporations more widely dispersed
geographically, but also sectorally. In Asian manufacturing, if there is a bias, it is
toward agribusiness, electronics, and textiles. Among services, FDI ranges broadly from
construction and real estate, to financial services, to wholesale and retail trade.
Perhaps only in extractive industries is the range of Asian investments smaller in
mining and petroleum than that recorded by American and Japanese multinationals. In
short, the Asian investments of ethnic Chinese multinationals are becoming ever-more
diffused across countries and industries--moving in a direction opposite that of the
Americans, but consistent with that of Asia's other intra-regional investors, the
Japanese and Koreans.
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTINATIONALS
The present study extends earlier comparisons of American and Japanese
multinationals to identify and explain emerging similarities and persistent differences
in the strategies and structures these MNCs have adopted across Asia and elsewhere in
the world. Of particular concern, in light of prior research, is the multinational
management of an interrelated series of strategic trade-offs concerning both the strategy
11
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and structure of foreign operations.21 These trade-offs are stylized below as six sets of
binary choices affecting a multinational's shareholdings, sales, value-added, markets,
sourcing, and trade. Such choices are common to all multinational corporations, and
thus permit a comparative analysis of American and Japanese multinationals in Asia and
elsewhere across the Triad.
Shareholdings: Majority Subsidiaries vs. Minority Affiliates
Choices regarding equity ownership and managerial control are among the first to
be confronted by all multinationals investing abroad. The logic for majority ownership
and undisputed control is often compelling: MNCs create and sustain a competitive
advantage through the skillful management of tangible and intangible assets in
technology, marketing, organization; such assets are specific to each individual firm,
and are often best exploited when that firm owns a majority (including all) of the equity
shareholdings in its foreign subsidiaries. Compared to minority shareholdings, a
majority position can grant the multinational parent a higher degree of managerial
control over the foreign use of that firm-specific assets. Such managerial control, in
turn, often helps to reduce the high costs that can plague more "arm's-length"
transactions between foreign suppliers of firm-specific assets and unaffiliated buyers
overseas. Instead of using such arm's-length transactions, these foreign suppliers
transfer their tangible and intangible assets internally--directly to their majority-
owned subsidiaries abroad. Later, reverse transfers also take place, as foreign
subsidiaries begin to ship goods and services back to their multinational parent, as well
as to other related affiliates overseas. In the end, this circular flow enhances the total
pool of technological, marketing, and organizational assets available to both the
multinational parent and its majority subsidiaries.
At least since the Second World War, American multinationals have consistently
invested in majority-owned subsidiaries, rather than in minority-owned affiliates.
12
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Indeed, as early as 1957, U.S. MNCs reported to the U.S. Commerce Department (in its
first postwar census of the foreign operations of U.S. companies) that they owned
upwards of three-quarters of the equity invested in their subsidiaries abroad. 22 For the
Americans, relative shareholdings continued to grow slowly over the next decade, 23 so
that by 1992 majority U.S. subsidiaries accounted for over four-fifths of the assets
owned by American multinationals abroad (see Table 3). As a result of these
investments, U.S. MNCs reported that their majority-owned subsidiaries contributed an
ever-larger share of their total foreign sales: reaching three-quarters by 1966 (in the
Commerce Department's first "benchmark" survey of U.S. FD124), and climbing to over
four-fifths by 1992 (in the Department's most recent annual survey, summarized in
Table 3). What little remained was dispersed across equal-partnership joint ventures
and minority U.S.-owned affiliates. Thus today, for American multinationals, majority
ownership of foreign subsidiaries remains a prominent characteristic of their foreign-
investment strategies.
-- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE --
Similarly, majority ownership has become central to the investment strategies
of Japanese multinationals. Indeed, for 1992 (again, the most recent year for which
comprehensive data are available), Japanese multinationals reported to Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) that majority-owned subsidiaries
accounted for over two-thirds of the capital invested in their subsidiaries abroad (see
Table 3). As a result of that investment, Japanese multinationals reported that their
majority subsidiaries contributed four-fifths of their foreign sales--a share roughly
comparable to sales reported by the majority subsidiaries of American
multinationals.25
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TABLE 3
OVERSEAS SALES AND ASSETS BY LEVEL OF FOREIGN SHAREHOLDINGS, ACROSS
REGIONS, 1992-93
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS ABROAD, 1992
North
Worldwide America
$1,578.7 $232.1
82.3%
17.7%
$1,746.8
82.3%
17.7%
88.4%
11.6%
$240.0
84.9%
15.1%
Western
Europe
$858.8
89.1%
10.9%
$947.7
89.9%
10.1%
In Japan Other Asia
$161.7 $120.0
44.6%
55.5%
$163.9
54.4%
45.6%
83.8%
16.2%
$108.8
77.1%
22.9%
FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS
All Foreign
Sales MNCs
$ billion $1222.7
of which:
Majoritya
Minorityb
Assets:
$ billion
% by:
Majoritya
Minorityb
85.3%
14.7%
$1,809.9
79.8%
20.2%
IN THE UNITED STATES.
European Japanese
MNCs MNCs
$534.5 $334.8
88.9%
11.1%
$752.7
80.6%
19.4%
90.9%
9.1%
$458.5
87.1%
12.9%
1992
Other Asian
MNCs
$22.4
88.4%
11.6%
$34.8
99.7%
0.3%
Of which,
Korean MNC
$9.5
89.5%
10.5%
$8.0
88.7%
11.3%
JAPANESE
Sales
$ billion
% by:
Majoritya
Minorityb
Capital:
$ billion
% by:
Majoritya
Minorityb
KOREAN MULI
INVESTMENT
$ billion
% by:
Majoritya
Minorityb
MULTINATIONALS ABROAD.
North
Worldwide America
$633.2 $268.8
80.1%
19.9%
$88.1
69.9%
30.1%
86.9%
13.1%
$43.3
83.6%
16.4%
'INATIONALS ABROAD. 1993
North
Worldwide America
$5.6 $2.2
79.9% 93.4%
20.1% 6.6%
Sales
$ billion
% by:
Majoritya
Minorityb
Assets:
$ billion
% by:
Majoritya
Minorityb
Of which,
Korea
$11.8
33.9%
66.1%
$11.5
33.9%
66.1%
1992
Western
Europe
$178.7
77.4%
22.6%
$16.6
74.7%
25.3%
Asia
$124.7
69.2%
30.8%
$15.5
53.6%
46.4%
Western
Europe
$0.6
79.6%
20.4%
Asia
$2.2
71.6%
28.4%
- ----
TABLE 3 (continued)
Notes: aMajority foreign-owned subsidiaries.
bMinority foreign-owned subsidiaries and equal partnership (50:50) joint ventures.
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates. Preliminary 1992
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, June, 1994), Tables II.A.1 and III.A.1, n.p.; U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad: 1992 Benchmark Survey. Preliminary Results (Washington: USGPO,
August 1994), Tables A-2 and N-4, n.p.; Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
Industrial Policy Bureau, International Business Affairs Division, The Fifth Comprehensive
Survey of Foreign Investment Statistics [Dai go-kai wagakuni kigyo no kaigai jigyo katsudo].
(Tokyo: MITI, 1994), Tables 2-9 and 4-2, pp. 134, 481; Bank of Korea, Foreign Exchange
Department, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook: 1994 (Seoul: BOK, 1994),
Table 11.4, pp. 70-71.
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Korean and other Asian multinationals report a similar preference for majority
ownership. For example, in the United States (the one country where comparable data
are available, reported in Table 3), they all report that majority-owned subsidiaries
contributed nearly nine-tenths of their sales and accounted for nearly all of their assets.
Moreover, this preference for majority ownership seems to have strengthened over
time. Majority Korean-owned subsidiaries, for example, accounted for just over one-
half (56 percent) of all Korean investments abroad as recently as 1987.26 But by
1993 (the most recent year for which data are available) they reported to the Bank of
Korea that majority Korean-owned subsidiaries accounted for nearly four-fifths of
their net investments abroad--a share comparable to that reported by American and
Japanese multinationals. As a result, Korean and other Asian (principally ethnic
Chinese) multinationals have become indistinguishable from their American and
Japanese counterparts in the shared pursuit of majority ownership in foreign
subsidiaries.
For all of these multinationals, however, the incidence of majority ownership
varies across industries, and especially across the value-added chain. On the extremes
of that chain, subsidiaries engaged principally in overseas distribution, generally
evidence a larger proportion of foreign shareholdings than do those subsidiaries engaged
principally in natural-resource extraction abroad. As a result, American and Japanese
multinationals report that their majority mining or petroleum subsidiaries account for
below-average investments and sales, while their majority-owned manufacturers and
especially wholesalers are above-average.27 Such variation within and across
industries reflects, in part, differences in financial (and other operational) risks,
especially since average investments are typically lower in downstream wholesaling
than, say, in upstream mining or refining, where greater risks may be shared with
joint-venture partners. Moreover, variations in ownership patterns also reflect
differences in a multinational's need for managerial control, since (as we shall see
14
below) downstream wholesaling is often tightly linked to intra-firm trade between
multinational parents and their foreign subsidiaries.
Moreover, within any one of these sectors (say, manufacturing), additional
variation can be found, reflecting important differences in firm-specific assets and
industrial structures. In textiles, for example, Japanese manufacturers often teamed up
with Japanese trading companies (sogo shosha), which could claim extensive trading
experience across Asia: By 1974, at least three such sogo shosha-C. Itoh, Marubeni,
and Mitsui--had invested aggressively in Asian textiles, typically through multi-party
joint ventures with Japanese manufacturers. 28 Moreover, while establishing these
subsidiaries, Japanese trading companies showed particular biases reflecting longer-
term structural relationships between traders and manufacturers: C. Itoh and Marubeni
spread their investments among Japan's three largest textile manufacturers (Toray,
Teijin and Toyobo); Mitsui concentrated its investments in Toray alone. By
concentrating their investments in this way, and by teaming manufacturers with traders
in a single joint venture, Japanese multinationals could insure majority Japanese
shareholdings.
Yet, while sogo shosha often proved crucial to Japanese investments in Asian
textiles, they remained notably absent from electronics and most other industries--
where joint ventures with local partners also proved of less value. 29 For example,
during the 1970s, the median Japanese equity holding in Asian textiles was 51 percent;
meanwhile, in electronics, Japanese shareholdings reached figures as high as 66
percent, the industry-wide average at that time. As we shall see below, electronics and
other differentiated products, especially those requiring after-sales service, often
require producers to integrate vertically from production to distribution, prompting
little demand for the commodity-trading expertise of Japanese trading companies or the
host-market expertise of local partners.
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In addition, variations in shareholding patterns also reflect wide differences in
the government policies prevailing across host countries. For example, the incidence of
capital controls is generally lower in industrialized North America than in the European
Union, and lower in these two regions than in Asia. As a result, American and Japanese
multinationals report that the incidence of majority foreign ownership is generally
higher in North America than in Western Europe, and higher in the EU than in Asia (see
Table 3). Moreover, within these regions, the incidence of majority shareholdings
varies widely across countries.30 In Asia, for example, Hong Kong and Singapore have
the highest incidence of majority foreign ownership. Given a multinational's strong
preference for majority ownership, plus the several locational advantages of Hong Kong
and Singapore, both economies (as we saw above) ranked among the top three investment
destinations for American and Japanese multinationals in Asia (see Table 1).
By contrast, India lost its early post-war ranking among the top Asian
destinations for American multinationals in part because domestic capital controls
severely limited both the inflow of FDI and the subsequent level of foreign ownership.31
As a result, as recently as 1992, majority U.S.-owned subsidiaries accounted for less
than one-quarter of either the sales or the assets of all U.S.-affiliated companies
operating in India,32 up only slightly from one-fifth of total sales and assets nearly two
decades earlier, in 1977.33 Similarly, in Korea, limited investments in majority U.S.-
owned subsidiaries generated barely one-third of the sales recorded by all American
multinationals operating there, up from one-fifth back in 1977. As a result, both
countries have come to attract very little new FDI from either American or Japanese
multinationals; to reverse this trend, both countries have begun to relax their capital
controls as part of a larger liberalization of their national economies.
Yet, long after capital liberalization, Japan illustrates the extreme impact that a
long legacy of capital controls continues to have on foreign ownership patterns.3 4
Specifically, in Japan, limited investments in majority U.S.-owned subsidiaries still
16
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generated less than one-half of the sales recorded by all American multinationals as
recently as 1992 (see Table 3), more than a decade after formal liberalization. The
remainder, accounting for most multinational sales in Japan, still came from minority
U.S. affiliates even though the relative position of these minority affiliates had actually
declined over the previous decade, thanks in large part to the liberalization of capital
controls. Indeed, with such a great preponderance of minority affiliates, Japan actually
has more in common with newly-industrializing Korea and developing India than with
most other Asian countries, which on this measure have more in common with the
several countries of North America and Western Europe.
Sales: Foreign Investment vs. International Trade
After securing majority ownership and managerial control, multinationals often
employ their foreign subsidiaries to sell in overseas markets far more than they and
other exporters back home ship to these same markets. As a practical matter, pressures
to increase foreign sales through direct investment abroad, and not just through
international trade alone, increase when any of several conditions arise: when foreign
governments severely constrain or credibly threaten to limit imports; when global
competitors derive significant cost and other country-specific advantages from their
overseas location; when indigenous buyers in large markets demand closer relations
with their foreign suppliers; and when foreign exporters seek to hedge against
exchange-rate risks by matching both revenues and costs in the same currency.
Otherwise, multinationals will continue to supply offshore markets through
international trade. Thus, the strategic choice is often viewed simply (and, as we shall
see below, somewhat incorrectly) as one between foreign investment and international
trade.
For the Americans, the predominance of foreign sales derived from FDI rather
than from international trade is not new.35 As early as 1957, the foreign (largely
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majority U.S.-owned) subsidiaries of American multinationals reported total overseas
sales at twice the value of total U.S. exports. 36 A decade later, by 1966, the combined
foreign sales of these majority U.S. subsidiaries had risen to represent three times the
value of all U.S. exports.37 Subsequently, that 3:1 ratio of foreign sales to U.S. exports
has remained largely unaltered. In fact, during 1992, American multinationals
continued to sell nearly three times as much overseas through their majority
subsidiaries than the United States exported to the world (see Table 4)--further
testimony to the fact that U.S. FDI continues to carry international competition well
beyond cross-border trade.
-- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE --
Similarly, Japanese corporations have also come to generate more of their
overseas sales through foreign investment rather than through international trade. But
for the Japanese, this evolution is of very recent origin, reflecting their prolonged
status as traders rather than investors. In fact, as late as 1977, Japanese subsidiaries
reported total foreign sales to be roughly equivalent to Japanese exports worldwide. 38
But by 1992, following a decade of rapid growth in Japanese FDI abroad, Japanese
subsidiaries (most of which were majority Japanese-owned) reported foreign sales
nearly two times larger than all Japanese exports worldwide (see Table 4). Thus,
beginning in the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, Japanese multinationals have
begun to follow the lead of their American counterparts by generating more overseas
sales through foreign investment than through international trade.
For both the Americans and the Japanese, the relative mix of overseas sales
generated either by foreign investment or international trade again varies widely across
regions and industries. On one extreme is Western Europe, where both the majority
subsidiaries of American and Japanese multinationals record above-average sales. In
18
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TABLE 4
THE RATIO OF FOREIGN SALES BY MULTINATIONAL SUBSIDIARIES TO U.S. AND
JAPANESE TRADE, 1992
THE RATIO OF U.S. SUBSIDIARIES' SALES ABROAD TO U.S. EXPORTS. 1992
Location of Foreign Sales by
Subsidiaries/ Majority US Ratio of Sales to
Destination of Subsidiaries US Exports Exports
Exports: X ' (B) (A/B)
All Countries ($ bil.) $1,298.5 $448.2 2.9
of which:
North America $205.2 $131.2 1.6
European Community $678.7 $103.0 6.6
Japan $72.1 $47.8 1.5
Other Asia $100.6 $79.1 1.3
$4.0 $14.6 0.3
Of which, Korea
THE RATIO OF FOREIGN AFFILIATES' SALES IN THE' UNIED STATESTO U.S, IMPORTS. 1992
National Origin of US Sales by Majority Ratio of Sales to
Subsidiaries/ Foreign Subsidiaries US Imports Imports
Source of Imports (A i (A/B)
All Countries ($ bil.) $1,043.1 $532.7 2.0
of which:
European Community $475.2 $94.0 5.1
Japan $304.4 $97.4 3.1
Other Asia $19.7 $135.7 0.1
Of which: Korea $8.5 $16.1 0.5
THE RATIO OF JAPANESE AFFILIATES' SALES ABROAD TO JAPANESE EXPORTS. 1992
Location-of Sales/ Foreign Sales by Japanese Ratio of Sales to
Destination of Japanese Affiliates Exports Exports
Exports: ( A) Iw (A/B)
All Countries ($ bil.) $633.2 $340.0 1.9
of which:
North America $268.8 $107.6 2.5
European Community $178.7 $62.9 3.0
Asia $124.7 $117.6 1.1
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates, Preliminary 1992
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, June 1994), Table llI.E.3, n.p.; Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States: 1992 Benchmark Survey, Preliminary Results (Washington: USGPO, August
1994), Table E-4, n.p.; International Trade Administration, Office of Trade and Investment
Analysis, US Foreign Trade Highlights: 19g0i(Washington, DC: USGPO, July 1994), Tables 14
and 15, pp. 34-41; Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Industrial Policy
Bureau, International Business Affairs Division, The ifth Comprehisive i Survey of Foreiagn
Investment Statistics [Dai go-kai wagakuni kigyo no kaigai jigyo katsudo]. (Tokyo: MITI,
1994), Table 2-25, pp. 188-199; International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics
Yearbook: 1993 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1993), pp. 240-242.
·-·13-·IPllrl-·C"·*-·llsf...lfl"" I.^--·III 
LCL--q
fact, during 1992, the majority U.S.-owned subsidiaries sold in Europe over six times
more than did all U.S.-based exporters (see Table 4). Leading the way here during
1992 were U.S. automakers and component suppliers, who sold over 20 times more
through majority subsidiaries operating in the EC than they did through U.S. exports to
the EC.39 By comparison, Japanese automakers lagged their U.S. counterparts, as did
most of Japanese industry. Consequently, Japanese subsidiaries in Europe sold three
times more than did all Japan-based exporters--well above their worldwide average,
but one-half the comparable ratio reported by the Americans (see Table 4).
Moreover, for the Japanese, this 3:1 ratio was somewhat new, in marked
contrast to the Americans, who can trace their quite stable 6:1 ratio back at least to the
mid-1 960s.40 By then, several factors combined to attract the foreign investments of
American and, later, Japanese multinationals to Europe: the growth in European demand
for sophisticated products already available in the United States and Japan, the erection
of common EC barriers to U.S. and Japanese exports of these products, the reduction of
comparable barriers to internal EC trade of these products, the emergence of scale
economies in the production and distribution of these products, and the exertion of
formidable pressures by both strong European buyers and powerful European
competitors.
These same pressures have also pulled European and, more recently, Japanese
multinationals to the United States. Among the first to respond, European subsidiaries
in the United States during 1992 sold over five times more than did European exporters
(see Table 4)--thus approaching the ratio of foreign sales to exports recorded by the
Americans in Europe for over 30 years. But for the Europeans, that 5:1 ratio has lagged
the Americans by at least a couple of decades. By 1974, for example, European
subsidiaries sold three times more in the United States than did European-based
exporters. 41 Like the Europeans back then, so too the Japanese by 1992, reported that
their majority subsidiaries in the United States sold over three times more than did
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Japanese exporters (see Table 4). For the Japanese, this ratio of U.S. sales to exports
was nearly double their worldwide average, and was of very recent origins: just five
years earlier, in 1987, the ratio of foreign sales to international trade was barely over
2:1.42 By increasing the ratio of foreign sales to national exports, Japanese
corporations are following a similar evolutionary path to that charted earlier by
European multinationals in America, and by American multinationals in Europe.
Ranked well behind both the Japanese and (esp- -Sally) the Europeans are Korean
and other Asian multinationals. For example, in 199' -jority Korean subsidiaries
operating in the United States reported U.S. sales with one-half the value recorded then
by all U.S. imports from Korea (see Table 4)--up from less than 40 percent of the
value just five years earlier, in 1987.4 3 During those five years, the nominal value of
U.S. imports from Korea remained roughly constant, while the corresponding value of
Korean FDI in the United States nearly tripled.44 As a result, the recent growth of US
sales generated by majority Korean subsidiaries in the United States outpaced
comparable sales generated by Korean exports. In comparison with the Koreans,
however, other Asian multinationals still remain far more dependent on international
trade to generate their US sales. By this measure, then, Korean multinationals are much
further advanced than other Asian multinationals in their evolution along the same
path charted earlier by European and Japanese multinationals in the United States.
Extending that same evolutionary path back to Asia, however, has been difficult.
To understand why, consider the fate of foreign subsidiaries in Japan. There, by 1992,
majority U.S. subsidiaries fared only slightly better than did U.S.-based exporters (see
Table 4); similarly, European multinationals also reported low levels of foreign sales to
match an equally low level of exports.45 Nevertheless, these figures represented a
modest improvement over the previous decade: In 1982, Japanese sales by majority
U.S. subsidiaries were nearly identical to those of U.S.-based exporters.46 Specifically,
in Japan, several factors help to account for such limited market ac.ess.47 Early on,
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import protection combined with capital controls both to limit overall FDI inflows and to
concentrate those inflows in minority foreign-owned affiliates. This legacy, however,
has begun to change with trade and capital liberalization--but only slowly, since
liberalization came well after fresh outflows of U.S. FDI reached their postwar high
(during the late 1960s and early 1970s). Subsequently, fresh outflows of U.S. FDI
actually fell off, to be replaced by reinvested earnings in existing subsidiaries.48 But
without investment earnings to reinvest, American multinationals soon realized that
Japanese industrial organization had come to replace Japanese government policies as
the principal barriers to market access in Japan. As a result, American and European
multinationals have moved at a slower pace in Japan as they progress along an
evolutionary path charted earlier by them--and later followed by Japanese
multinationals--in other industrialized countries.
Meanwhile, elsewhere in Asia, progress on that same evolutionary path has also
proved difficult, not only for American multinationals, but also for the Japanese.
Specifically, both reported in 1992 that foreign sales generated through foreign
investment were slightly larger those generated through international trade (see Table
4). Moreover, the ratio of subsidiaries' sales to international trade has actually
declined over the past decade, at least for the Americans: In 1982, foreign sales by
majority U.S. subsidiaries in Asia were actually twice the value of all U.S. exports to
that region,49 not near the parity reported in 1992 (see Table 4). It seems that trade
and capital liberalization over the past decade in Asia had a differential impact on the
Americans, favoring U.S. exports more immediately than U.S. FDI: Between 1982 and
1992, the value of U.S. exports to Asia actually tripled, while the value of foreign sales
by majority U.S. subsidiaries in Asia only doubled. By contrast, for the Japanese,
subsidiaries' sales and exports both grew fourfold in Asia between 1980 and 1992,50
leaving the ratio of subsidiaries' sales to exports roughly comparable. As a result of
these different changes, Asia has little in common with the more advanced market--not
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just in North America and Western Europe, but also Japan--where the historical
evolution of both American and Japanese multinationals favors foreign investment over
international trade as the preferred means for generating foreign sales.
However, the relative mix of overseas sales generated either by foreign
investment or international trade varies widely across the region. In Korea, for
example, 1992 sales by majority U.S. subsidiaries still fail to equal U.S. exports there
given the limited value of U.S. FDI in that country. By contrast, in Singapore, the second
largest Asian host to U.S. FDI, the sales of majority U.S. subsidiaries are three time
larger than U.S. exports there51--roughly the same ratio recorded by the Japanese in
both North America and Western Europe (see Table 4). Between the extremes
represented by Singapore and Korea, however, the rest of Asia looks more like Japan, at
least when measured by the near-parity in foreign sales generated by both U.S.
investors and U.S. exporters operating across the region.
Compared to either the Americans or the Japanese in Asia, Korean multinationals
seem much less reliant on foreign investment, and far more reliant on international
trade, to generate their Asian sales. In this region, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are
Korea's three largest export markets. Of these, neither Hong Kong nor Singapore ranked
among the top ten hosts for Korean FDI in 1993. Only Japan ranked among the top five
hosts, but over two-thirds of all Korean FDI there was concentrated in real estate,52
with little obvious impact on trade. Most of the remaining Korean FDI in Japan was
concentrated in the wholesale sector, where it presumably did provide limited sales
support for Korean exports. Elsewhere in Asia, however, Korean FDI was concentrated
not in downstream exports markets, but rather in geographic locations--notably
Indonesia and China--where FDI in offshore manufacturing and natural-resource
extraction serve as potential sources of upstream supply for markets back home and in
third countries.
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Value-Added: Offshore Production vs. Overseas Distribution
To generate their foreign sales, multinational corporations often invest in
majority-owned subsidiaries that produce offshore goods and services that are then
supplied to markets both abroad and back home. In addition to the more general
pressures promoting FDI outlined above, that investment is more likely to establish
offshore production when national governments not only limit imports but also promote
exports; when factor costs, relative productivity, and other location-specific
advantages figure prominently in global competition; and when erstwhile exporters can
significantly reduce their exchange rate risks by matching more of their costs in the
same currency as their revenues. Otherwise, multinationals will continue to supply
offshore markets through international trade, often supplemented by direct investments
in overseas distribution. Such distribution is especially important in industries where
multinationals derive distinct competitive advantages by establishing dedicated sales
channels and by offering more after-sales service.
Quick to respond to the pressures for offshore production have been the
Americans: At least as early as 1957, and continuing for more than three decades, 53 the
value of offshore production by American multinationals was nearly twice the value of
U.S. manufactured exports (see Table 4). The Americans concentrated most of their
foreign manufacturing in advanced markets, especially in the European Community,
where during 1992 majority U.S.-owned manufacturing subsidiaries generated sales
over four times larger than U.S.-based manufacturers exported to the EC (see Table 4).
To illustrate an extreme case, consider how American automakers and parts suppliers
generate their European sales: During 1990, for example, U.S. auto exports (including
parts and components) to the EC totaled roughly $3 billion; compare this sum to the
sales generated both in local host markets ($37 billion) and in nearby regional markets
($34 billion) by the EC plants of U.S. automakers. 54 For American corporations, then,
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direct investment in offshore production has become their principal strategy for gaining
and maintaining market access in the EC.
-- INSERT TABLES 5 HERE --
Like the Americans in the European Community, so too the Europeans in the
United States have come to employ direct investment in offshore production as their
principal strategy for gaining and maintaining market access. But their movement is of
more recent origin. As late as 1974, the value of U.S. production by European
multinationals roughly equaled U.S. imports of European manufactured goods.55 (Even
when we add to this figure the estimated value of additional assembly operations by
European subsidiaries engaged principally in U.S. wholesaling, the total value of local
production probably does exceed all U.S. imports from Europe.) Still, such offshore
manufacturing remained well below comparable production by American multinationals
in Europe. However, over the next two decades, the Europeans moved to cut this
difference in half, so that by 1992 their manufacturing subsidiaries in the United States
actually reported U.S. sales nearly two-and-half times larger than U.S. imports of
European manufactured goods (see Table 5). As a result, both American and European
multinationals have generally managed to produce and sell many more manufactured
goods in each other's home market than they and other national exporters shipped across
the Atlantic.
In contrast to both the Americans and the Europeans, Japanese multinationals
have continued to pursue a very different offshore-manufacturing strategy, one that
still lags Japanese exports of manufactured goods. As recently as 1992, for example,
foreign sales resulting from offshore production by Japanese subsidiaries in North
America and the EC were less than three-quarters the total value of Japanese
manufactured exports to these markets (see Table 5). Even when we add to these local
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TABLE 5
OFFSHORE PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURED EXPORTS, AND OVERSEAS
DISTRIBUTION BY AMERICAN, EUROPEAN, AND ASIAN MULTINATIONALS,
1992
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS ABROAD. 1992
Location of Sales by Majority Uc
Subsidiaries/ Subsidiaries Engage(
Destination of Principally in
Exports: Manufacturing
All Countries ($ bil.) $629.5
of which, in:
North America $120.6
European Community $369.8
Japan $28.4
Other Asia $36.6
IS0
d
US Exports of
Manufactured Goods
$368.5
$115.4
$87.1
$30.3
$59.9
Sales by Majority US
Subsidiaries Engaged
Principally in
Wholesaling
$242.2
$22.8
$124.1
$19.5
$21.7
FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES. 1992
Sales by Foreign
National Origin of Affiliates Engaged
Subsidiaries/ Principally in US US Ir
Source of Imports Manufacturing Manufact
All MNCs ($ billion) $427.0 $
of which, from:
European Community
Japan
Other Asia
Of which: Korea
$217.6
$68.3
$6.4
$1.2
nports of
tured Goods
434.3
$84.1
$95.8
$112.4
$16.3
Sales by Foreign
Affiliates Engaged
Principally in US
Wholesaling
$374.0
$112.0
$214.2
12.4
$8.1
JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS ABROAD, 1992
Location Sales by Japanese
of Sales/ Affiliates Principall
Destination of Engaged in Foreign
Exports: Manufacturing
All Countries ($ bil.) $201.3
of which. in:
North America $80.7
European Community $42.1
Asia $63.7
Japanese
Exports of
Manufactured Goods
$340.0
$107.6
$62.9
$117.6
Sales by Japanese
Affiliates Principally
Engaged in Foreign
Wholesaling
$391.0
$173.4
$125.7
$54.8
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates, Preliminary 1992
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, June 1994), Table III.E.3, n.p.; Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States: 1992 Benchmark Survey, Preliminary Results (Washington: USGPO, August
1994), Table E-4, n.p.; International Trade Administration, Office of Trade and Investment
Analysis, US Foreign Trade Highlights: 1993 (Washington, DC: USGPO, July 1994), Tables 14
and 15, pp. 34-41; Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Industrial Policy
Bureau, International Business Affairs Division, The Fifth Comprehensive Survey of Foreign
-Investment Statistics [Dai go-kai wagakuni kigyo no kaigai jigyo katsudo]. (Tokyo: MITI,
1994), Table 2-25, pp. 188-199; International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics
Yearbook: 1993 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1993), pp. 240-242.
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sales the assembly operations of Japanese subsidiaries engaged principally in overseas
distribution, the total value of Japanese production in America and Europe still barely
equals U.S. or European imports of manufactured goods from Japan. For the Japanese,
however, this low ratio of foreign production to international trade actually represented
a significant increase in offshore manufacturing. Indeed, less than two decades earlier
(in 1977), Japanese manufacturers and (to a much lesser extent) Japanese trading
companies had reported exports from home four times larger than the worldwide
production recorded by Japanese subsidiaries abroad.56 Yet, despite such growth, these
Japanese subsidiaries had little in common either with American multinationals in
Europe or with EC multinationals in the United States.
Instead, the Japanese in America and Europe share more in common with the
Americans and Europeans in Japan. There, as recently as 1992, majority U.S.-owned
manufacturing subsidiaries recorded foreign sales roughly equal in value to U.S.
manufactured exports there (see Table 5). The Americans, of course, are not alone in
their failure to implement the same offshore production strategy that served them so
well in other industrialized countries. To the contrary, European multinationals also
evidence the same low level of Japanese production to match their limited exports to
Japan.57 Nevertheless, for foreign multinationals in Japan, these 1992 ratios
represented a significant improvement from just a decade earlier. In 1982, for
example, majority U.S.-owned manufacturing subsidiaries recorded foreign sales
roughly one-half the value of U.S. manufactured exports there.58 Subsequently, even as
U.S. manufactured exports to Japan grew, the Japanese sales of U.S. manufacturers
operating majority subsidiaries in Japan grew even faster. This is the most obvious
impact in Japan of increased U.S. FDI in majority subsidiaries, an increase made easier
by the liberalization of Japanese capital controls. With such growth in local production,
American (and European) multinationals have only recently begun to follow in Japan an
evolutionary path charted much earlier by them in North America and Western Europe.
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Progress along that evolutionary path has advanced less quickly elsewhere in
Asia, the one region where both American and Japanese multinationals do have much in
common. Specifically, both rely more on international trade than offshore production to
generate sales in that region. In fact, majority U.S. subsidiaries manufacturing in Asia
reported 1992 sales roughly three-fifths the value of all U.S. manufactured exports to
that region (see Table 5), just slightly more than the comparable ratio for the Japanese.
Moreover, these ratios had improved only marginally over the last decade, at least for
the Americans: Between 1982 and 1992, both U.S. manufactured exports to Asia and
sales by majority U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries had both more than tripled.59
However, for the Japanese, the rapid rise of Japanese FDI in Asian manufacturing had
significantly altered the ratio of offshore production to manufactured trade: Between
1980 and 1992, even as Japanese exports to Asia grew fourfold, the offshore production
of Japanese subsidiaries in the region grew six fold.60 Yet, even though American and
Japanese multinationals had both increased their FDI in Asian manufacturing during the
1980s, the resulting production from that investment had still not overtaken
manufactured exports as the principal source of supply.
Moreover, wide variation in the ratio of local production to manufactured trade
can be also discerned across countries. On one extreme is Singapore where, as recently
as 1982, U.S. exports were much larger than total sales by U.S. subsidiaries
manufacturing there. But a decade of ever-increasing FDI by American manufacturers
in Singapore dramatically reversed that ratio, so that by 1992 the majority
subsidiaries of these U.S. manufacturers reported sales from local production with a
total value greater than all U.S. manufactured exports to Singapore.6 1 By contrast, on
the other extreme is India. There, the value of local production by majority U.S.
subsidiaries remained well below the value of otherwise small U.S. exports to India--
and the value of that local production had actually declined over the prior decade despite a
modest increase in U.S. trade. In short, while Singapore has emerged as a major offshore
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production site for American (and Japanese) multinationals, India has not--and most of
the rest of Asia falls between these two extremes.
In addition to offshore production, Asia has also emerged as an important depot
for overseas distribution--the upstream buying and downstream selling of both goods
and services. Here, again, both American and Japanese multinationals have much in
common. For both, offshore production exceeds overseas distribution in Asia. But for
the Americans, Asia represents the one region where overseas distribution is not
dwarfed by offshore production--while for the Japanese, Asia is the one region where
offshore production actually exceeds overseas distribution. And for both, Hong Kong is a
major distribution center, given the concentration there of FDI in wholesaling and other
trade-related services. As a result of that U.S. FDI, for example, U.S. wholesalers in
Hong Kong report foreign sales over twice as large as U.S. manufacturers report
there.62 A decade earlier, in 1982, Singapore could also claim to be a distribution
center for American multinationals, given the rough parity in sales there between
overseas distribution and offshore production; 63 but by 1992 sales by U.S. distributors
were barely one-third the size of sales by U.S. manufacturers.64 In both Hong and
Singapore, then we see the recent effects of economic specialization, emphasizing in
these two cases either offshore manufacturing or overseas distribution.
Such sp cialization, of course, is not limited to countries, but is also visible at
the company lev I, where dedicated trading companies may differentiate themselves from
more traditional anufacturers. Among the Japanese, for example, we have already seen
that sogo shosh have often teamed up with textile manufacturers to form joint ventures
in Asia. In all of hese joint ventures, Japanese trading companies considered their
Asian investmen s as growing markets for trade arbitrage, principally serving as
purchasing agents authorized to buy commodities upstream, but also serving as
marketing agents authorized to sell commodities downstream.65 However, the same
relationship did not hold in electronics, automobiles, and several other industries
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where, as we have also noted, sogo shosha did not prove crucial to Japanese FDI in
Asia.66 Outside of textiles, then, Japanese manufacturers often established dedicated
sales channels and after-sales service networks to aid their overseas distribution of
goods produced at home and abroad.
By investing aggressively in overseas distribution, Japanese multinationals are
following a strategy they have long pursued back in Japan, where they tightly control
their own proprietary distribution systems. 67 Such control over distribution channels
has severely constrained foreigners' access to the Japanese market.68 Seeking to
overcome such entry barriers in Japan, American (and European) multinationals have
aggressively invested in majority subsidiaries engaged principally in Japanese
distribution; in this way, they have pursued an unusual strategy, one without parallel
for Americans operating in other industrialized countries (see Table 5).
By contrast, in these more advanced markets, overseas distribution has been far
more central than offshore production to the foreign-investment strategies of Japanese
multinationals, certainly when compared to their American counterparts (see Table 5).
In both North America and Western Europe--but not in Asia--foreign sales by
Japanese-owned wholesalers are between two and three times larger than the foreign
sales of Japanese-owned manufacturers. By contrast, in all three of these regions,
majority U.S.-owned manufacturers report foreign sales larger than those generated by
majority U.S.-owned distributors. Indeed, in North America and Western Europe, these
U.S. manufacturers sell three to five times more than do U.S. distributors also operating
there. So, in marked contrast to the Americans, Japanese multinationals have invested
far more aggressively in wholesaling subsidiaries in order to lower the transaction and
information costs associated with upstream purchasing and downstream marketing.
Far more like the Japanese were the Koreans, who generated eight times more
U.S. sales during 1992 through their direct investments in U.S. wholesaling than
through their FDI in U.S. manufacturing--far in excess of other Asian multinationals
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(see Table 5). To generate these sales, nearly one-half of all Korean FDI in the United
States is invested in U.S. retail and wholesale trade, far more than the one-fifth invested
in manufacturing. Similarly, in Japan, retail and wholesale trade is the second largest
category (falling well behind real estate) of otherwise limited Korean investments
there, well ahead of minuscule investments in Japanese manufacturing.69 By contrast,
elsewhere in Asia, Korean manufacturing investments dwarf those in retail and
wholesale trade, in a sharp departure from Japanese strategy across that region. In
short, the striking similarities evidenced by both Japanese and Korean multinationals
operating in the United States do not carry over to Asia.
Markets: Local vs. Export Markets
In general, foreign sales come from three sources: the host-country market of
the foreign subsidiary, the home-country market of that subsidiary's parent, and third-
country markets that are typically in close geographic proximity to the host country.
Choices among these three are determined by a wide range of variables, including the
following: market size and growth prospects, as well as market access resulting from
government policies and competitor behavior. Given these relative weightings, as a
practical matter, multinational corporations typically generate most of their foreign
sales in the local market or one of two export markets (either back home or in third
countries), but seldom spread equally between two or among all three. Indeed, until
quite recently, multinationals have long focused almost exclusively on the local market
hosting their foreign direct investments.
For the Americans, at least during the 1950s and 1960s, these local markets
accounted for three-quarters of all foreign sales generated abroad by majority U.S.
subsidiaries.70 Subsequently, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing through the
1980s, that share gradually declined,71 so that it reached two-thirds of total foreign
sales worldwide by 1992 (see Table 6). That same year, Japanese multinationals
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worldwide also reported a comparable sales contribution by local host-country markets
(see Table 6). As with the Americans, so too with the Japanese, such a contribution had
also declined over the last two decades; in the early 1970s, for example, local markets
also contributed three-quarters of total foreign sales by Japanese subsidiaries
abroad.72 Thus, for both the Americans and the Japanese, local markets hosting their
FDI remain the principal sources of multinational sales globally. And they have reached
this comparable outcome by again evolving in a common direction, marked this time by a
general decline in the relative importance of local markets to generate foreign sales.
-- INSERT TABLE 6 HERE --
Of course, the relative importance of the host-country market in generating a
multinational's foreign sales varies widely across countries and regions. On one extreme
are the United States and Japan. For example, European and Japanese multinationals
both reported in 1992 that the local U.S. market consumed well over 85 percent of their
subsidiaries' total U.S. sales.73 Consequently, exports back home and to third countries
have remained quite small. Similarly, in Japan, American subsidiaries sold nearly 90
percent of their goods and services in the local market (see Table 6)--a figure
comparable to the local sales also generated there by European multinationals.74 In
short, the sheer size of the world's two largest markets continues to exert a powerful
and common influence on the investment strategies of American, European, and Japanese
multinationals.
In contrast to the United States and Japan, Western Europe offers both American
and Japanese multinationals greater opportunities to generate sales not only in the local
market hosting their investments, but also in so-called third-country markets,
typically located in close geographic proximity to the host country. Thanks in large part
to the European Union, exports to third countries contributed roughly one-third of the
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TABLE 6: THE DESTINATION OF FOREIGN SALES, 1992
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS ABROAD. ALL INDUSTRIES. 1992a
Sales
Destination:
$ billion
of which, %
Local
Back to US
3d Markets
Worldwide
$1,298.5
65.9%
10.1%
24.0%
North
America
$205.2
71.3%
25.9%
2.8%
Western
Europe
$765
64.0%
3.8%
32.2%
Japan Other Asia
$72.1 $100.6
89.0%
4.7%
6.3%
51.7%
19.5%
28.8%
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS ABROAD, MANUFACTURING ONLY 19 92a
Sales
Destination:
$ billion
of which, %
Local
Back to US
3d Markets
Worldwide
$629.6
58.7%
12.3%
29.0%
North
America
$120.5
59.5%
37.1%
3.4%
Western
Europe
$387.4
55.5%
3.7%
40.8%
Japan
$28.4
84.2%
7.4%
8.4%
Asia
Electronics Only
$13.0
23.8%
47.7%
28.5%
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS ABROAD. WHOLESALING ONLY. 1 992a
Sales
Destination:
$ billion
of which, %
Local
Back to US
3d Markets
Worldwide
$242.2
71.1%
4.3%
24.6%
North
America
$22.8
88.2%
7.0%
4.8%
Western
Europe
$160.6
69.2%
2.1%
28.7%
Japan
$19.5
88.2%
4.6%
7.2%
JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS ABROAD, ALL INDUSTRIES, 1992
Sales:
$ billion
of which. %
Local
Japan
3d Markets
North
Worldwide America
$633.2 $268.8
66.3%
14.5%
19.2%
78.4%
12.6%
9.0%
Western
Europe
$178.7
54.8%
8.4%
36.8%
East Asia
$124.7
59.4%
21.8%
18.8%
JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS ABROAD. MANUFACTURING ONLY. 1992
Sales:
$ billion
of which, %
Local
Japan
3d Markets
North
Worldwide America
$201.3 $80.7
76.7%
6.3%
17.0%
91.9%
2.8%
5.3%
Western
Eumrp
$42.1
55.7%
1.2%
43.1%
Manufactudin
$63.7
66.1%
15.8%
18.1%
JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS ABROAD. WHOLESALING ONLY, 1992
Sales:
$ billion
of which. %
Local
Japan
3d Markets
North
Worldwide America
$391.0 $173.4
60.3%
19.4%
20.3%
70.8%
18.0%
11.2%
Western
Europe
$129.7
54.4%
11.6%
33.0%
$54.8
47.9%
31.2%
20.9%
Other
Manufacturing
$36.6
37.4%
35.0%
27.6%
Other Asia
$21.8
49.5%
17.9%
32.6%
Asia
Electronics Only-
$23.0
45.7%
27.2%
27.1%
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TABLE 6 (continued)
Notes: aData for majority U.S.-owned subsidiaries only.
Source: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates. Preliminary 1992
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, September 1992), Table III.F.2, n.p.; Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States: 1992 Benchmark Survey. Preliminary Results (Washington:
USGPO, August 1994), Tables G-2 and G-24, n.p.; Japan, Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, Industrial Policy Bureau, International Business Affairs Division, The Fifth
Comprehensive Survey of Foreign Investment Statistics [Dai go-kai wagakuni kigyo no kaigai
jigyo katsudo]. (Tokyo: MITI, 1994), Table 2-25, pp. 188-199.
___________ __I__IICn______II___ lm___________l________I_
total Western European sales recorded by both American and Japanese multinationals
operating there (see Table 6). Those shares were higher still in manufacturing, where
third-country exports mostly to other EC members contributed nearly comparable
shares--40 percent--of the total European sales recorded by American and Japanese
multinationals engaged in production there. For both, such a percentage is well above
their global averages: U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries sold just over one-quarter of
their total foreign sales in third-country markets, compared to one-sixth or so for
their Japanese counterparts. Thus, the common pressures of regional integration are
having a similar impact on both American and Japanese multinationals, and that impact
varies across regions as well as across industrial sectors.
But these same pressures are having a different impact in both North America
and Asia. In North America, third-country sales by both American and Japanese
multinationals remain small, especially in manufacturing. But in Asia, American
multinationals lead the way in promoting intraregional trade. In both manufacturing and
wholesaling, these third-country sales contributed nearly 30 percent of the total
revenues generated across Asia by U.S. subsidiaries, well above comparable shares (less
than 20 percent) generated by all Japanese subsidiaries operating in that region (see
Table 6). So, while American and Japanese multinationals are following comparable
export strategies regarding third-country markets in Western Europe and North
America, the same cannot be said in Asia.
In addition to third-country exports, Asia also provides these multinationals
with sizable--yet different--opportunities to export back to their home markets (see
Table 6). Indeed, when combined across industries, both American and Japanese
multinationals during 1992 generated roughly one-fifth of their total Asian sales
through exports back home. For the Japanese, this share is well above comparable sales
generated by home-bound exports from their subsidiaries elsewhere in the world;
whereas for the Americans, this share is just below comparable sales for their
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subsidiaries operating closer to home, in Canada and Mexico. As this comparison
suggests, geography matters, with distance from the home country an important
determinant of FDI-related trade.
But in Asia, the importance of the home country as an export market varies
widely across industries, and between multinationals (see Table 6). For the Japanese,
most of these home-bound shipments come from Asian subsidiaries engaged in the
wholesale trade of local purchases exported to Japan; these Japanese-owned wholesalers
accounted for twice as many exports to Japan as did Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries
in Asia. For the Americans, by contrast, most home-bound shipments come from
majority subsidiaries engaged in Asian manufacturing: These U.S. manufacturing
subsidiaries generated 35 percent of their total Asian sales from exports back to the U.S.
market. This share is roughly comparable to that generated by U.S. manufacturing
subsidiaries in both Canada and Mexico, and is well over twice the share generated
through exports back home by Japanese manufacturers operating in Asia. Once again, we
see that American and Japanese manufacturers in Asia are following different export
strategies, this time with regard to their home markets.
No where is the difference in market orientation between American and Japanese
multinationals more apparent than in the manufacture of electronics (see Table 6). In
this industry, an American preoccupation with export markets back home has been
matched by a Japanese preoccupation with the local host-country market. In fact,
shipments back home to the United States accounted for nearly one-half of the total sales
reported in 1992 by U.S. electronics subsidiaries in Asia, while their Japanese
counterparts generated a roughly comparable share of their total sales in the local host-
country market. In a similar juxtaposition, these same Japanese electronics
subsidiaries in Asia generated roughly one-quarter of their 1992 sales from exports
back home--nearly the same share generated by their U.S. counterparts from sales in
the local host-country market. Only in shipments to third-country markets,
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principally located elsewhere in Asia, did American and Japanese electronics
manufacturers in Asia follow a common trade strategy, and thus generate comparable
shares of their total sales.
More generally, then, Japanese multinationals in Asia are far more interested in
the local market hosting their FDI than in exporting either to their home or to third-
country markets. For example, Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries in Asia generated
fully two-thirds of their 1992 sales in the host-country market --nearly twice the
comparable share recorded by American manufacturers. Indeed, for the Americans, the
last time local markets generated such a sizable share of their Asia sales was nearly
three decades earlier when, in 1966, their majority subsidiaries reported that host-
country markets contributed fully three-quarters of their Asian sales.75 For the
Americans at least, that earlier attention to local markets was a response to the import-
substituting policies operating then across Asia.
But with the subsequent liberalization of these policies, and the movement toward
more outward-oriented policies, Asia illustrates some of the most rapid decline in the
relative importance of host-country markets in generating sales, especially for
American multinationals. In fact, by 1977, the sales contribution of the local market in
Asia had declined significantly, reaching two-fifths of total Asian sales; nearly as much
was now being exported to the United States, with the remainder shipped to third-
country markets. 76 By comparison, that same year, Japanese multinationals sold much
less outside of the local market hosting their Asian investments. In fact, during 1977,
that local host-country market accounted for fully three-fifths of total foreign sales
generated by all Japanese multinationals in Asia.77 Thus, for both the Americans and the
Japanese, sharp differences in export strategies visible as early as 1977 were only
accentuated by 1992.
The conclusion that American multinationals generate a greater proportion of
their subsidiaries' sales in Asia from export markets strongly contradicts a popular
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argument advanced by at least one important school of Japanese scholars. These scholars
have long argued that Japanese multinationals pursue investment strategies that are far
more trade-enhancing than those favored by American multinationals.78 For relevant
data, these scholars focus on the 1970s and 1980s, and especially on Asia, the only
region where both American and Japanese multinationals can claim long histories of
direct investment. Yet, when we combine exports back home with exports to third
countries, we come to a very different conclusion: For the last two decades, Japanese
multinationals have been less reliant on international trade to generate their foreign
subsidiaries' sales in Asia than have American multinationals.
Trade: Intracompany Shipments vs. Arm's-Length
Much of the trade conducted by multinational corporations is shipped
intracompany, among and between parents and their subsidiaries--a fact that has
recently attracted the renewed attention of academic scholars.79 For multinationals,
such hierarchical trade insures greater control over both upstream supplies and
downstream markets than do more arm's-length transactions among unaffiliated buyers
and suppliers. Intracompany trade also substantially lowers the high costs which these
arm's-length transactions normally impose on those cross-border exchanges of the
technological, marketing, and organizational assets necessary to compete successfully
through foreign production and overseas distribution. As we argued above, only with
majority ownership do multinationals exercise sufficient managerial control to dictate
their subsidiaries' decisions regarding these exchanges; such control is far more
circumscribed in minority affiliates. Empirically, intracompany trade seems especially
prominent in autos and other industries where significant economies can be achieved
through the integration and coordination of multiplant operations; or where additional
advantages can be gained through after-sales service.
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On one extreme, U.S.-Japan trade illustrates the growing predominance of
intracompany shipments. Here, Japanese multinationals exercise unrivaled control
over the two-way flow (see Table 8). By 1992, in fact, over two-thirds of all U.S.
imports from Japan and over one-half of all U.S. exports to Japan were shipped
intracompany, largely between the parents of Japanese multinationals and their
(principally majority) subsidiaries in the United States. Among imports, for example,
the auto industry--cars, parts and components--accounted for over one-quarter of all
Japanese shipments to the United States, most of which (over 80 percent) were shipped
by Japanese automakers and parts suppliers directly to their U.S. subsidiaries.80
Similarly, for U.S. exports to Japan, intracompany trade again predominates:
Shipments from Japanese subsidiaries in the United States back to their Japanese
parents account for upwards of two-thirds of all U.S. exports to Japan. Largely raw
materials and agricultural products, these U.S. exports are then channeled by Japanese
multinationals into their proprietary distribution channels back home. There, Japanese
trading companies and manufacturers often enjoy lower information and transaction
costs, as well as related advantages, than do more arm's-length U.S. exporters. For the
Japanese, then, foreign direct investment has created the princikal channels for two-
way trade flows with the United States.
-- INSERT TABLE 8 HERE --
By contrast, American multinationals exercise no appreciable influence over U.S.
bilateral trade with Japan. Here, limited U.S. FDI, and the concentration of that FDI in
minority foreign-owned affiliates serves as an especially high barrier in Japan to U.S.
exports. Indeed, minority affiliates typically represent poor markets for national
exports, even in those host countries where affiliates' sales are relatively large. For
example, during 1992, U.S. exports to minority U.S. affiliates worldwide remained
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TABLE 8
U.S. TRADE, BY INTRACOMPANY AND ARM'S LENGTH SHIPMENTS, ACROSS
REGIONS AND COUNTRIES, 1992
U.S. TRADE WITH THE WORLD. 1992
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
% by US % by
Parents to/fm All Foreign % by
Majority US Affiliates in US % All Other=
Direction Total Value Subsidiaries to/from Their Intracompany= Arm's-Length=
of Trade (US $ billion) Worldwide Parents (B)+(C) (100%)-(D)
US Exports $448.7 22.1% 10.5% 32.6% 67.4%
US Imports $532.7 16.0% 25.2% 41.2% 58.8%
U.S. TRADE WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. 1992
(A) (B)
% by US
Parents to/fm
Majority US
Total Value Subsidiaries in
(US $ billion) the EC
$122.6 26.3%
$110.7 11.8%
(C)
% by
EC Affiliates in
US to/from
Their Parents
8.4%
34.2%
(D)
Intracompany=
(B)+(C)
34.7%
46.0%
(E)
% by
All Other=
Arm's-Length=
(100%)-(D)
65.3%
54.0%
U.S. TRADE WITH JAPAN. 1992
(B)
% by US
Parents to/fm
Majority US
Subsidiaries in
Japan
15.5%
2.1%
(C)
% by
Japanese
Affiliates in US
to/from Their
Parents
52.7%
67.7%
(D)
Intracompany=
(B)+(C)
68.2%
69.7%
(E)
% by
All Other=
Arm's-Length=
(1 00%)-(D)
31.8%
30.3%
U.S. TRADE
Direction
of Trade
US Exports
US Imports
WITH ASIA (OUTSIDE JAPAN). 1992
(A) (B)
% by US
Parents to/fm
Majority US
Total Value Subsidiaries in
(US $ billion) Asia
$90.5 9.3%
$135.7 11.1%
(C)
% by
Asian
Affiliates in US
to/from Their
Parents
5.6%
6.8%
(D)
Intracompany=
(B)+(C)
14.9%
17.3%
(E)
% by
All Other=
Arm's-Length=
(100%)-(D)
85.1%
82.2%
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates. Preliminary 1992
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, June 1994), Table III.H.1, n.p.; and Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States: 1992 Benchmark Survey. Preliminary Results (Washington:
USGPO, August 1994), Table G-2, n.p.; and International Trade Administration, Office of Trade
and Investment Analysis, US Foreign Trade Highlights: 1993 (Washington, DC: USGPO, July
1994), Tables 6 and 7, pp. 17-24.
Direction
of Trade
US Exports
US Imports
(A)
Total Value
(US $ billion)
$47.8
$97.4
Direction
of Trade
US Exports
US Imports
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TABLE 9
THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF MULTINATIONALS TO ASIAN EXPORTS, LATE
1980s TO EARLY 1990s
All Industries Electronics Only
(% of total exports) (% of total exports)
Four NIEs
Korea (1986) 26.1% NA
Taiwan (1986) 17.8% 30.8%
Hong Kong NA NA
Singapore (1989) 86.1% NA
ASEAN Four
Thailand (1990) 3 3 .0%a,b 82.0%b
Malaysia (1991) 57.1% 82.5%a
Indonesia (1992) 32 .0%a 76.0%
Philippines NA NA
Big Two
India (1991) 9.1% NA
China (1994) 36.1% NA
Notes:
aManufacturing only.
bGovernment-promoted firms only.
Source: Compiled from various sources in Dennis J. Encarnation, "Integrating Asia:
Multinationals and the Private Management of Regionalization" (forthcoming, 1996)
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negligible--accounting for only 6 percent of all U.S. exports to U.S. multinationals
abroad--even though minority affiliates contributed just under 20 percent of all U.S.
multinational sales. 81 More specifically, in Japan, U.S. exports to minority U.S.
affiliates during 1992 barely totaled $2.5 billion, much less than the $7 billion of U.S.
exports shipped that same year to majority U.S. subsidiaries in Japan.82 Yet, these
majority subsidiaries accounted for barely $72 billion of sales in Japan, well below the
$90 billion in Japanese sales recorded by minority U.S. affiliates (calculated from Table
8 above).
In short, because Japan has long hosted a disproportionately large share of
minority U.S. affiliates, and because these affiliates generally refrain from purchasing
U.S. exports, American multinationals in Japan have contributed a relatively small
share of this bilateral trade. By contrast, for the Japanese, the higher incidence of
majority subsidiaries in the United States actually has granted Japanese exports far
greater access to the U.S. market than the Americans, through their limited investments
concentrated in minority affiliates, have been able to secure in Japan.
In marked contrast to U.S.-Japan trade, U.S.-EC trade remains far more
symmetrical--as do U.S.-EC investment flows--permitting neither American nor
European multinationals to dominate these bilateral flows. As a result of these
multinationals, in fact, intracompany trade contributed over two-fifths of all U.S.
imports from the EC (see Table 8). Here again, autos figure prominently: They
comprise the largest class of traded goods (accounting for 16 percent of U.S. imports
from the EC), of which nearly 90 percent are shipped intracompany, by BMW and other
EC automakers to their majority subsidiaries in the United States.83 Indeed, as a
general rule, the parents of EC multinationals are the largest suppliers of U.S. imports
from Europe, with their (largely majority) subsidiaries in the United States the largest
buyers.
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Conversely, looking at U.S. exports to the EC, the parents of U.S. multinationals
are the largest contributors, often through intracompany shipments to their majority
subsidiaries in the EC. In such trade, U.S. auto exports remain small since U.S.
automakers manufacture in the EC most of what they sell there, in the absence of much
auto trade, then, intracompany shipments to the EC accounted for just over one-third of
all U.S. exports to the EC (see Table 8). Finally, what remains of U.S.-EC trade is
shipped at arm's-length, between unaffiliated exporters and importers. Such trade
accounted for well over two-thirds of all U.S. exports to Europe, and over one-half of all
U.S. imports from Europe (see Table 8). Here again, MNCs play a prominent role; for
example, the U.S. parents of American multinationals are major exporters to
unaffiliated EC buyers, accounting for a full one-third of all U.S. exports to Europe. 84
In each of these ways, then, U.S.-EC trade more closely mimics U.S. trade with the world
as whole, in its relative mix of intracompany and arm's length trade (see Table 8).
If U.S.-EC trade more closely approximates average U.S. trade, with U.S.-Japan
trade on one extreme dominated by intracompany shipments, then U.S. trade with the
rest of Asia is on an opposite extreme, dominated by more arm's-length transactions.
Such transactions, in fact, accounted during 1992 for well over four-fifths of all U.S.
exports to, and all U.S. imports from, Asia (outside Japan). For sure, American
multinationals did play a role in that trade; for example, through shipments to
unaffiliated buyers, their U.S. parents shipped roughly one-quarter of all U.S. exports
to Asia. 85 In addition, intracompany shipments between these U.S. parents and their
Asian subsidiaries contributed another 10 percent to bilateral trade flows (see Table 8).
That limited contribution reflects the fact that during 1992 Asia outside Japan continued
to account for a smaller proportion of all U.S. FDI (stocks) abroad than did, say,
Western Europe.
Moreover, even within Asia, only a very few countries attracted U.S. FDI,
especially investments in majority U.S. subsidiaries. Singapore, as we have already,
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ranks among the two largest hosts to U.S. FDI in Asia (outside Japan). And as a result, in
U.S. trade with Singapore, intracompany trade within American multinationals accounted
for well over one-quarter of all U.S. exports, and nearly three-fifths of all U.S.
imports. By contrast, Korea has long restricted FDI inflows, especially in majority
foreign-owned subsidiaries. And as a result, in U.S trade with Korea, shipments
between the parents and subsidiaries of American multinationals accounted for less than
2 percent of all U.S. exports, and barely 4 percent of all U.S. imports. What remaining
impact American multinationals had on U.S.-Korea trade was principally through
shipments between US parents and unaffiliated Korean buyers; for example, these
arm's-length shipments accounted for nearly two-fifths of all US exports to Korea. 86
This paucity of US intracompany trade, and the greater reliance by American
multinationals on more arm's-length transactions, is reminiscent of US trade with
Japan: In Korea, as in Japan, limited U.S. FDI concentrated in minority US-owned
affiliates helps to account for this absence of U.S. intracompany trade.
Similarly, limited Asian FDI in the United States has also constrained
intracompany trade between the parents and subsidiaries of Asian multinationals (see
Table 8). Only Korean multinationals have employed their limited FDI to exercise a
disproportionate influence over their country's trade with the United States. For
example, intracompany shipments between the parents and (largely majority -owned)
subsidiaries of Korean multinationals during 1992 exceeded one-quarter for all US
imports from Korea. This share was nearly equal to the average contribution of
intracompany trade by foreign multinationals to all US imports; and it was three times
larger than Asian multinationals generally contributed to U.S. imports from the region
(see Table 8). Even for US exports to Korea, the relative contribution of intracompany
shipments by Korean multinationals again exceeds that recorded by other Asian
multinationals: During 1992, Korean subsidiaries in the United States shipped nearly
one-tenth of all US exports back to their Korean parents. This share was twice the
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relative contribution recorded by shipments between American multinational parents
and their majority subsidiaries in Korea; and it equaled the average contribution of
intracompany trade by European multinationals to US exports to Europe. Outside of
Korea, however, the absence of significant two-way FDI flows between the United States
and Asia (outside Japan) limits most intracompany transactions, leaving arm's-length
trade to predominate.
Similarly, Japan's trade with the rest of Asia is dominated by arm's-length
shipments. Nevertheless, during 1992, intracompany trade between the parents and
subsidiaries of Japanese multinationals contributed over 15 percent of all Japanese
exports to the region, and nearly 23 percent of all Japanese imports--roughly twice
comparable levels of intracompany trade recorded by American multinationals. Thus, in
Asia, as in the rest of the world, Japanese multinationals continue to exercise a greater
influence over their country's bilateral trade than do American multinationals.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE STRATEGY AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
Just as FDI has become integral to the Asian operations of multinational
corporations (MNCs), so too that FDI has also become critical to economic performance
and, consequently, government policy across Asia. Of particular concern here is the
complementarity between FDI and trade visible at both the micro-level of multinational
corporations and the macro-level of host economies. For both multinationals and their
hosts, wide variation persists in this FDI-trade nexus, and that variation can be
explained in part by persistent differences in government policy across Asia, and in part
by persistent differences among multinationals operating from different home bases.
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Corporate Strategy
What emerges from our comparative analysis of multinational corporations are
two models of foreign investment and related trade: a trans-Atlantic model evidenced in
the strategies and structures pursued by both American and European multinationals,
and a trans-Pacific model evidenced in the strategies and structures pursued by
Japanese, Korean, and other Asian multinationals. Distinguishing these two models are
persistent differences in the relationship between foreign investment and international
trade. Namely, compared to American and European multinationals, Japanese and other
Asian multinationals still sell more of their output in the host-country market than they
do through exports to markets back home or in third countries; they continue to source
more of their inputs from back home than from local or other third-country suppliers;
and they more aggressively control this two-way trade of outputs and inputs through
intracompany shipments linking multinational parents and their foreign subsidiaries.
These persistent differences cannot be dismissed easily as mere "vintage effects,"
vestigial remnants reflecting various stages in a multinational's evolution, since they
persist over time. Nor can they be dismissed as the result of wide variation in the
sectoral distribution or geographic location of these multinationals, such these
differences persist in the same industrial sector and host economy. Rather, the
persistence of these differences reflects important variation in the strategies and
structures pursued by multinational corporations based in different countries.
While sharp variation in the complex relationship between FDI and trade confirm
the persistence of important differences among multinationals, other operational
characteristics suggest a greater convergence in regional operations--as American,
European, Japanese, and other Asian multinationals continue to move along an otherwise
common evolutionary path. First, they all increasingly invest overseas in majority
subsidiaries, all the more so when their investments are unimpeded by capital controls
in the host country, and when their investments move down the value-added chain from
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extraction to manufacturing to wholesaling. Second, through these majority
subsidiaries, they increasingly generate a greater proportion of their foreign sales
through direct investments in markets overseas, and not just through international
trade unassisted by any such investments. Third, both to assist trade and to generate
additional foreign sales, they all invest offshore in majority subsidiaries engaged in
some combination of wholesaling and production, with the latter becoming an
increasingly important source of supply.
Fourth, with these new sources of supply, American, European, Japanese, and
other Asian multinationals all employ foreign subsidiaries to supply local markets
hosting their direct investments, as well as to supply export markets either back home
or in third countries. Fifth and finally, they all employ their foreign subsidiaries both
as internal markets for exported products and as internal sources of imported supplies,
linked to their parents back home (and to related subsidiaries elsewhere abroad)
through intracompany trade. While American multinationals pioneered many of these
investment and trade strategies immediately after World War II, they were later
followed to varying degrees by the Europeans (especially during the 1970s), then the
Japanese (especially during the 1980s), and now the Koreans, Chinese, and other Asians
(during the 1990s). In short, several of the foreign operations of multinationals
originating in different geographic locations have begun to converge, as they all move
along an otherwise common evolutionary path.
At times, that convergence has been even more pronounced in Asia than elsewhere
in the world, as demonstrated by the common geographic and industrial concentration of
FDI from various sources. More often, MNCs in Asia more closely mimic patterns of
convergence apparent elsewhere, as they do in the pursuit of majority shareholdings and
FDI-generated sales. Yet important differences in MNC operations persist, even in the
same host economy and industrial sector. In home-country sourcing and intra-firm
trade, for example, MNCs in Asia differ much like they do elsewhere in the world. Such
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differences may even be more pronounced in Asia than elsewhere, as demonstrated by
wide variation in host-market and export sales. When totaled, then, those operational
differences that remain are largely limited to the relationship between FDI and trade: on
export markets for outputs, on imported sources of inputs, and on the organization of
this two-way trade either through markets (arm's -length transactions) or hierarchies
(intra-firm transactions).
Government Policy
Just as the relationship between FDI and trade varies significantly among
multinational corporations, so too that relationship also varies across host economies.
With the total value of an economy's exports and imports bounded by savings rates and
other macro-level determinants, FDI can nevertheless contribute proportionately to
that trade, while also altering its composition and direction--not only for individual
multinationals, but also for host (and home) economies. Simultaneously, such trade can
have a significant impact on the value, direction, and composition of FDI, again at both
the micro-level of multinationals and the macro-level of national economies. These
complementarities between FDI and trade have recently attracted much attention. 87 And
they have important policy implications: Trade and FDI regimes shape a multinational
subsidiary's contribution to a host country's exports and imports.
Consider the relative contribution of multinational subsidiaries to Asian exports.
Among the region's ten largest economies, that export contribution ranges from a high
that approaches 90 percent in Singapore to a low that remains under 10 percent in India
(see Table 9). These two extremes cannot be explained simply in terms of obvious
differences in domestic market size. To the contrary, in marked contrast to India, China
reports that foreign-affiliated firms have come to contribute well over one-third of
total national exports in 1994, up from practically zero a decade earlier. That one-
third, moreover, was comparable to relative shares reported in quite different
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economies, such as Indonesia and Thailand. Indeed, across southeast Asia, multinationals
have emerged as major exporters, contributing over one-half of national exports not
only in Singapore, but also in Malaysia. (So large is the value both of these exports and
of domestic value-added that, in Malaysia at least, multinationals export far more than
they import. 88) In north Asia, by contrast, the export contribution of multinationals is
much smaller, as we can see in both Taiwan and Korea. What distinguishes these two
Asian NIEs from Singapore is a combination of government policies that simultaneously
limit FDI (especially in Korea) while encouraging domestic producers.
-- INSERT TABLE 9 HERE --
Just as FDI can contribute proportionately to the value of trade, so too it can also
shape the composition of that trade. No where is this more apparent than in the
electronics industry, which (as we noted above) has attracted considerable FDI from
American, Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, and other regional electronics producers. Much
of that FDI is concentrated in southeast Asia, where (as we also noted above) it is
primarily export-oriented. fIn the near-absence of corresponding exports by
domestically-owned electronics manufacturers, we find that multinationals contribute
upwards of three-quarters of all electronics exports from Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia (see Table 9). Thus, across these ASEAN economies, FDI by
multinationals has helped to change the composition of manufactured exports to include
electronics. By contrast, in Taiwan, a thriving electronics industry populated largely
by domestically-owned producers results in a much lower contribution by
multinationals to electronics exports. Yet, even in Taiwan, that foreign contribution to
the economy's exports is higher in the electronics industry than in most other industrial
sectors, further testimony to the continuing importance of FDI in helping to determine
the composition of an economy's trade.
43
'
Finally, FDI can also influence the direction of trade by facilitating access to
output markets and supply sources, especially those in industrialized countries. This
seems especially true in Japan, where market access has long been limited for foreign
exporters unaffiliated with Japanese manufacturers and distributors. No where is this
more apparent than in bilateral U.S.-Japan trade. Here, Japanese-owned subsidiaries
contribute well over one-half of all U.S. exports to Japan and account for well over two-
thirds of all US imports from Japan--nearly all shipped intracompany, between these
subsidiaries and their Japanese parents. By comparison, Japanese subsidiaries in Asia
still exercise less hierarchical control over bilateral trade between their Asian hosts
and Japan. While the reasons for this are multiple, one stands out: Japanese
multinationals in Asia have been far more reluctant than their American counterparts to
export large proportions of their Asian output back home (or to third countries),
preferring instead to sell in the local host-country market. By contrast, Japanese
multinationals in Asia have been much less reluctant than the Americans to rely on their
home-based suppliers as principal sources of their Asian inputs. In this way,
multinationals reinforce the prevailing structure of Asian trade, in which the United
States remains the principal export market and Japan remains the principal source of
imported supplies.
These persistent differences in corporate strategy continue to pose challenges for
government policymakers across Asia. To illustrate one such challenge: With export
revenues denominated principally in U.S. dollars and import costs (not to mention the
foreign debt often incurred to finance these imports) denominated in large part by
Japanese yen, government policymakers must manage exchange-rate risks quite similar
to those faced by global managers of multinational corporations. One response, for
policymaker and manager alike, is to try to match revenues and costs in the same
currency. This could be accomplished, for example, through the diversification of
markets, suppliers, and products (both outputs and inputs), with a corresponding
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redirection of two-way trade and resultant shifts in the relative value of bilateral flows.
But as this paper documents, such a structural adjustment in Asian trade will be
difficult to accomplish without a corresponding impact on FDI. For as we have seen,
sharp differences can still be discerned between multinationals in their determination of
markets for outputs, sources for inputs, and the organization of that trade between
markets (arm's-length transactions) and hierarchies (intra-firm transactions). These
institutional factors, bounded by more macroeconomic determinants, shape the relative
complementarities between trade and FDI.
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TABLE 7
HOME-COUNTRY EXPORTS TO MULTINATIONAL SUBSIDIARIES, AS A SHARE OF
SUBSIDIARIES SALES, 1992
THE RATIO OF U.S. SUBSIDIARIES' SALES ABROAD TO U.S. EXPORTS. 1992
Location of Foreign Sales by US Exports to US
Subsidiaries/ Majority US US Exports to US Subsidiaries as a % of
Destination of Subsidiaries Abroad Subsidiaries Abroad Subsidiaries' Sales
Exports: (A (B) (B/A)
All Countries ($ bil.) $1,298.5 $114.1 8.8%
of which:
North America
European Community
Japan
Other Asia
$205.2
$678.7
$72.1
$100.6
$52.5
$32.1
$7.8
$9.5
25.6%
4.7%
10.8%
9.4%
THE RATIO OF U.S. IMPORTS TO FOREIGN AFFILIATES' SALES IN THE UNITED STATES. 1992
Home-Country
Home-Country Exports to Foreign
National Origin of US Sales by Foreign Exports to Foreign Subsidiaries as a % of
Affiliates/ Subsidiaries in the US Subsidiaries in the US Subsidiaries' Sales
Source of Imports: (E (B/A)
All Countries ($ bil.) $1,222.6 $182.2 14.9%
$649.8
$334.8
$22.5
$41.0
$73.5
$12.2
6.3%
22.0%
54.2%
THE RATIO OF JAPANESE EXPORTS TO JAPANESE AFFILIATES' SALES ABROAD, 1992
Location of
Affiliates/
Destination of
Exports:
All Countries ($ bil.)
of which:
North America
European Community
Asia
Foreign Sales by
Japanese Affiliates
Abroad
$633.2
$268.8
$178.7
$124.7
Japanese
Exports to Japanese
Affiliates Abroad
(B)
$118.3
$52.9
$33.8
$21.7
Japanese
Exports to Japanese
Affiliates as a % of
Affiliates' Sales
(B/A)
18.6%
19.7%
18.9%
17.4%
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates. Preliminary 1992
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, June 1994), Table III.E.3, n.p.; Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States: 1992 Benchmark Survey. Preliminary Results (Washington: USGPO, August
1994), Tables E-4 and G-30, n.p.; Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
Industrial Policy Bureau, International Business Affairs Division, The Fifth Comprehensive
Survey of Foreign Investment Statistics [Dai go-kai wagakuni kigyo no kaigaijigyo katsudo].
(Tokyo: MITI, 1994), Table 2-25, pp. 188-199.
of which:
Europe
Japan
Other Asia
